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For	whom	does	justice	work?	The	Mladić	verdict	and
prospects	for	reconciliation	in	the	Balkans
Former	Bosnian	Serb	general,	Ratko	Mladić,	has	been	found	guilty	of	genocide	and	war	crimes	at
the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former	Yugoslavia	(ICTY).	Reacting	to	the	verdict,	Denisa
Kostovicova	states	there	is	broad	consensus	that	the	work	of	the	ICTY	has	not	translated	into
reconciliation	among	the	affected	communities	in	the	Balkans.	However,	it	is	problematic	to	judge
the	legacy	of	decades	of	work	by	the	international	criminal	court	based	on	a	single	benchmark	such
as	reconciliation,	and	a	better	response	would	be	to	assess	what	obstacles	exist	to	facilitating
reconciliation	and	how	communities	in	the	Balkans	can	now	move	forward.
Ratko	Mladić	at	the	ICTY	on	22	November	(published	with	permission	from	the	ICTY)
In	the	closing	statement	of	the	trial	of	former	Bosnian	Serb	Army	general,	Ratko	Mladić,	at	the	International
Criminal	Tribunal	for	former	Yugoslavia	in	The	Hague,	the	prosecutor	set	his	expectations	uncompromisingly.	He
demanded	a	life	sentence	for	Mladić	so	as	not	to	insult	‘the	victims,	living	and	dead’.
No	lesser	sentence	was	deemed	appropriate	for	this	‘master	of	life	and	death’	in	Bosnia,	who	was	charged	with
11	counts	of	genocide	and	war	crimes	for	the	worst	atrocities	on	European	soil	since	World	War	Two.	Around	a
hundred	thousand	people	were	killed,	and	over	two	million	left	their	homes	during	the	Bosnian	war	from	1992-
1995.
And	what	a	master	he	was.	He	himself	picked	the	neighbourhoods	of	Bosnia’s	capital	Sarajevo	to	be	shelled
mercilessly	by	Bosnian	Serb	forces	in	the	three-year-long	siege;	he	efficiently	delivered	on	the	directive	to	make
life	‘unbearable’	in	the	eastern	Bosnian	enclaves	of	Srebrenica	and	Zepa;	he	reassured	people	of	Srebrenica	of
their	safety,	as	the	killing	of	some	8,000	Bosnian	Muslim	men	and	boys	was	about	to	get	under	way.
In	fact,	it	was	the	violence	that	took	place	under	his	command	throughout	Bosnia	that	triggered	the	establishment
of	the	ICTY	in	1993.	UNSC	Resolution	827	refers	to	“reports	of	mass	killings,	massive,	organized	and	systematic
detention	and	rape	of	women,	and	the	continuance	of	the	practice	of	“ethnic	cleansing”,	including	for	the
acquisition	and	the	holding	of	territory.”	Now,	22	years	after	the	end	of	the	war,	of	which	Mladić	spent	nearly	16	in
hiding,	the	judgment	has	arrived.
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It	was	a	life	sentence,	and	a	guilty	verdict	for	all	but	one	count	of	the	indictment.	The	sentence	will	bring	some
satisfaction	to	all	victims,	though	the	pain	remains	theirs	forever	to	bear.	Questions	will	undoubtedly	be	raised
over	why	the	genocide	charge	was	not	upheld	in	the	case	of	six	of	Bosnia’s	municipalities,	from	where	members
of	the	Bosnian	Muslim	and	Bosnian	Croat	population	were	removed,	detained,	tortured,	sexually	abused	and
killed.	Nonetheless,	the	‘butcher	of	the	Balkans’,	as	Mladić	came	to	be	known,	stood	accused	of	the	worst	crimes
that	can	be	committed:	genocide,	crimes	against	humanity	and	violations	of	the	laws	or	customs	of	war.	The
harrowing	details	the	presiding	judge	Alphons	Orie	recounted	were	a	reminder	of	the	brutality	of	those	crimes
against	women	and	men,	young	and	old.	But	the	Mladić	verdict	is	a	lesson	that	will	travel	beyond	the	Balkans:	it
is	a	clear	message	to	what	is	not	permissible	in	war	and	for	what	a	price	will	be	paid.
Benchmarks	of	success
The	Mladić	verdict	was	the	penultimate	verdict	before	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former
Yugoslavia	in	The	Hague	wraps	up	its	work	after	24	years	of	its	existence.	While	it	may	have	taken	some	time	for
this	experiment	with	international	criminal	justice	to	get	into	gear,	on	the	eve	of	its	closure	it	will	have	sentenced
over	80	war	criminals	over	nearly	11,000	trial	days.
Justice	has	been	slow	and	pain-staking,	as	minutiae	of	evidence	was	being	dissected	and	contested	by	the
prosecution	and	the	defence	teams	in	a	series	of	trials	for	violence	of	unimaginable	brutality	and	proportions	in
the	Balkan	wars.	It	has	resulted	in	the	establishment	of	legal	facts	about	committed	war	crimes	and	responsibility
for	them.
But,	there	is	consensus	that	the	work	of	the	Hague	court	has	not	translated	into	reconciliation	among	the	affected
communities	in	the	Balkans,	based	on	the	acceptance	of	those	facts.	This	view	is	shared	by	experts,	the
international	tribunal’s	officials,	and	even	by	a	war	criminal	who	has	served	his	ICTY	sentence.
It	is	erroneous,	and	not	just	simplistic,	to	judge	the	legacy	of	the	decades	of	work	of	the	international	criminal
court	based	on	a	single	benchmark,	such	as	reconciliation.	After	all,	the	court	will	leave	behind	a	complex	legacy
on	many	fronts:	in	the	Balkans,	it	has	transformed	the	debate	about	war	crimes	and	responsibility,	which	would
not	have	taken	place	without	it;	it	showed	that	even	the	most	powerful	cannot	escape	justice;	it	allowed	victims	to
see	justice	being	done;	it	established	a	historical	record	of	one	of	the	most	tumultuous	periods	in	the	region;	it	led
to	changes	in	international	jurisprudence,	such	as	in	the	area	of	sexual	violence,	to	name	just	a	few.
But,	it	is	the	issue	of	reconciliation,	or,	more	precisely,	failed	reconciliation,	that	captures	the	minds	of	observers.
The	biggest	danger	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Mladić	verdict	is	to	accept	the	premise	that	international	criminal
justice	may	bring	some	solace	and	satisfaction	to	the	victims	and	survivors	of	unspeakable	crimes,	but	that	it
ultimately	cannot	–	nor	should	it	be	expected	to	–	bring	about	reconciliation	among	communities	in	the	Balkans.
Rather,	more	probing	questions	are	in	order:	chiefly,	where	are	the	obstacles	to	reconciliation?	And	what	is	to	be
done	about	it?
Spaces	of	reconciliation
In	the	run-up	to	the	Mladić	verdict,	it	was	clear	that	whatever	the	outcome,	it	would	be	interpreted	through	an
ethnic	lens.	Such	conflicting	interpretations	ostensibly	show	that	justice	cannot	pave	the	way	for	communities	to
face	a	violent	past	and	move	forward.
There	is	by	now	a	well-known	mechanism	that	achieves	this	purpose:	responding	to	the	individualisation	of
responsibility	that	is	a	defining	premise	of	criminal	justice	and	implicating	an	entire	nation	in	culpability	for	war
crimes.	For	example,	the	Bosnian	Serb	press	ran	a	headline	that	the	sentence	for	Mladić	is	a	sentence	for	all
Bosnian	Serbs.	Another	Bosnian	Serb	official	said	that	his	sentence	was	bound	to	be	unjust,	but	that	Mladić
‘would	always	be	a	Serb	hero.’
This	has	now	become	a	well-rehearsed	script	in	response	to	landmark	verdicts.	Not	so	long	ago,	we	saw	it	at
work	in	response	to	the	genocide	verdict	of	war	time	Bosnian	Serb	political	leader	Radovan	Karadžić.	Such
rhetoric	divides	communities	throughout	the	Balkans.	But	does	it	mean	that	there	is	no	prospect	for	reconciliation
–	even	if	we	take	reconciliation	to	mean	nothing	more	than	working	together	to	address	past	wrongs?
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The	reality	on	the	ground,	among	the	ordinary	people	who	have	suffered	the	worst,	tells	a	different	story.	Those
who	have	suffered	come	together	across-ethnic	lines,	united	by	their	shared	experience	of	suffering	to	deal	with
the	painful	issues	of	the	past.	In	some	communities,	both	in	Bosnia	and	Kosovo,	they	get	together	secretly	at	a
local	level	–	so	as	not	to	be	seen	by	the	authorities	–	to	discuss	the	past	and	help	each	other.
In	my	recently	published	study	of	a	regional	civil	society	initiative	that	includes	all	ethnic	groups	in	former
Yugoslavia,	I	found	that	people	focus	more	on	issues	of	peace,	reconciliation	and	solidarity	when	they	meet	at	a
regional	level	as	opposed	to	a	national	level.	The	initiative,	known	by	its	acronym	RECOM,	advocates	the
establishment	of	a	regional	record	of	the	facts	of	war	crimes	and	other	human	rights	violations.
To	point	out	these	initiatives	is	not	to	minimise	the	sources	of	exclusive	ideologies	and	nationalism	in	everyday
life.	But	we	need	to	be	aware	of	alternatives,	too.	The	openings	for	some	form	of	accommodation	exist	at	a	local
and	regional	level;	while	the	obstruction	both	in	terms	of	the	absence	of	concrete	action	to	address	impunity	and
attempts	to	moderate	extreme	discourse	exists	at	the	national	level.
We	know	much	too	well	from	the	Balkan	experience	that	words	have	power.	It	is	very	easy	to	slip	from	saying	that
there	has	been	no	reconciliation	to	the	belief	that	there	cannot	be	any	reconciliation.	And	it	is	even	easier	to
blame	the	Hague	tribunal	for	this.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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